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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the effects of different labour unionisation 
structures on the firms’ incentives to innovate new products. 
Labour unions differ substantially between countries with respect to the 
degree of wage setting centralisation (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Moene and 
Wallerstein, 1997; Flanagan, 1999 and Wallerstein, 1999). Decentralised wage setting 
is often contrasted with centralised wage setting. Under a decentralised wage setting, 
wages are set between employers and firm-specific unions, while under a centralised 
wage setting, an industry-wide union negotiates wages with all firms (Haucap and Wey, 
2004). While the centralised argument is egalitarian in nature and generally makes the 
sufficiently substitutable workers better off (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988 and Davidson, 
1988), the rigidity associated with this system is generally bad for overall economic 
performance (Nickell, 1997 and Siebert, 1997). 
Given the diversity of unionised labour market, there is a growing literature 
(Haucap and Wey, 2004; Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre, 2002; Manasakis and 
Petrakis, 2009; Mukherjee and Pennings, 2011) that investigates the effects of different 
labour unionisation structures on innovation. Although the existing literature provides 
several important insights, their focus remained only on process innovation. Investment 
in process innovation is certainly a major part of firms' R&D expenditure, however, the 
firms in today's world also allocate a significant amount of their R&D budget towards 
product innovation. For example, as mentioned in Imai (1992), the Japanese firms 
allocate R&D budget in process innovation relative to product innovation at a ratio of 
60:40. It is argued in Mansfield (1988) that American firms have traditionally spent 
more in product innovation than Japanese firms. Our paper aims at closing the gap 
between product innovation and the structures of labour unions. 
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2 
It is intuitive that process and product innovations create different effects on 
labour demand and unionised wage. While product innovation increases the number of 
products in the market, by creating new demand for workers; process innovation, on the 
other hand, reduces the number of workers required in the production process by 
lowering the demand for workers. Hence, the effects of unionisation structures on 
product innovation demand new analysis. We take up this issue in this paper. Following 
the existing literature alluded earlier, we compare the incentives for innovation under a 
centralised union and decentralised unions respectively.1  
The main contribution of our paper lies in its focus on new product 
development, thus affecting the number of products offered in the market. This is in 
contrast to the existing literature that defines product innovation as an outcome of 
superior product quality or new process development of the existing products, thus 
keeping the number of products unaltered in the market. Symeonidis (2003) argue that 
an improvement in product quality can be interpreted as product innovation. Lin and 
Saggi (2002), Rosenkranz (2003), Braun (2008) and Lambertini and Mantovani (2009, 
2010), on the other hand, investigate the effects of product innovation where the degree 
of product substitutability acts as a proxy of product R&D. We depart from this strand 
of literature by considering the aspect of new product development which is marketed 
in addition to the existing products. Our modelling of product innovation is easily 
justifiable within multinational technology intensive firms. For example, Apple sells 
iPad in addition to MacBook, Samsung sells Galaxy Tab in addition to notebook. 
We develop a simple model of product innovation in Section 2. In a duopoly 
market structure, we assume that each firm has an existing product and may become a 
 
1
 Although we consider labour union as an upstream agent, it is worth mentioning that our results will 
hold if instead of labour unions, we portray the upstream agents as profit maximising input suppliers. 
With this interpretation, decentralised bargaining corresponds to a situation where firm-specific input 
suppliers bargain with the respective firms, and the centralised bargaining corresponds to a situation 
where a representative of the input suppliers bargains with a representative of the final goods producers. 
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3 
multiproduct firm by innovating a new product. We begin our analysis with the case 
where the products are symmetrically differentiated. A comparison between centralised 
and decentralised unions reveals that the latter union structure provides higher 
incentive for innovation compared to the former union structure. 
Although symmetric product differentiation can be a useful starting point, it 
may be a strong assumption to consider, particularly, if this assumption is important for 
our results. We show in Section 3 that the innovation incentive can be higher under a 
centralised union than under decentralised unions when the products are 
asymmetrically differentiated. In this section, we assume that the existing products are 
perfect substitutes and the new products are different from the existing products. This 
structure is certainly justifiable. As an example, we may visualise the first generation 
mobile phones which are mainly used for making calls and sending text messages as the 
existing products of the firms; whereas the third generation mobile phones with added 
features, such as better screen size, superior graphics, improved camera quality and 
web browsing facility, can be regarded as the imperfect substitutes of the existing 
products. One may argue that the first generation mobile phones can also be interpreted 
as imperfect substitutes due to their different layouts and the longevity of battery lives, 
however, it is more natural to assume that the third generation mobile phones are 
imperfect substitutes of the first generation mobile phones. As a simplification, we 
presume the first generation phones as perfect substitutes. 
With this setup our results show that the incentive for product innovation is 
higher under decentralised unions compared a centralised union if the existing and the 
new products are sufficiently differentiated meaning that the existing products do not 
face much competition from the new products. And, the result is reversed if the degree 
of product differentiation between the existing and the new products is sufficiently low. 
Further, we find that decentralised unions are welfare improving compared to a 
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4 
centralised union irrespective of the type of product differentiation. 
As discussed earlier, there is a strand of literature on innovation and unions 
that largely considers the effects of unions on process innovation and productivity. In a 
patent race model, Haucap and Wey (2004) show that if a centralised labour union 
charges a uniform wage to all firms, the incentive for innovation is higher under a 
centralised labour union. However, in case of wage discrimination by the centralised 
labour union, the incentive for innovation is higher under decentralised labour unions. 
In a model with R&D competition, Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) show that 
the incentive for innovation is higher under decentralised labour unions for non-drastic 
innovations, while the incentive for innovation can be higher under a centralised labour 
union when the innovation is drastic in nature. Manasakis and Petrakis (2009) show 
that, under non-cooperative R&D, the incentive for innovation is higher under 
decentralised labour unions if knowledge spillovers are high, but the incentive for 
innovation is always higher under decentralised labour unions under cooperative R&D. 
Considering an innovating firm and a non-innovating firm, Mukherjee and Pennings 
(2011) show the implications of technology licensing ex-post innovation. They show 
that if the unions' preferences for wage (compared to employment) are high, the 
innovator's incentive for innovation is higher under a centralised labour union 
irrespective of licensing ex-post innovation. However, if the unions' preferences for 
employment are high, the benefit from licensing may help to create higher incentive for 
innovation under decentralised labour unions.2 
The reasons behind the above-mentioned results are related to different types 
of constraints imposed by different union structures. Haucap and Wey (2004) show that 
the uniformity rule under a centralised union is more effective in constraining the 
 
2
 In contrast to these papers, earlier works have shown the impacts of union bargaining power. See Grout 
(1984) and Van der Ploeg (1987) for surveys and Tauman and Weiss (1987) and Ulph and Ulph (1994 and 
2001) for more recent contributions in this strand of literature. 
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5 
unions' hold-up potential that leads to higher incentives for innovation under a 
centralised union. However, if the centralised union discriminates wage, it helps the 
union to exploit its hold-up problem at the fullest, and as a result the innovation 
incentive can be lower under a centralised union. Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre 
(2002) show that the hold-up problems are affected by the nature of innovation, which 
may make production by the non-innovating firm unprofitable. Manasakis and Petrakis 
(2009) show that the degree of knowledge spillover and cooperation in R&D affect the 
hold-up problems created by the unionisation structures. In Mukherjee and Pennings 
(2010), the hold-up problems are present both in the innovation stage and in the 
technology licensing stage. Under licensing ex-post innovation, competition between 
the unions under decentralised unions is more effective in softening the hold-up 
problem, thus creating a stronger incentive for licensing under decentralised unions.  
In contrast, product innovation creates different wage effects in our analysis. If 
a firm invents a new product, its labour demand increases due to an increase in the 
number of products produced by the innovator, although the new product reduces 
labour demand for the existing products. Whether this wage effect increases the 
hold-up problem under decentralised unions or under a centralised union depends on 
the degree of product differentiation between the existing and the new products. In 
contrast to the previous papers on process innovation, in our paper, the labour 
unionisation structures may have ambiguous effects on product innovation even if the 
centralised union charges a uniform wage, the innovations are non-drastic and there is 
neither knowledge spillover nor technology licensing. 
So far, we have focused on the theoretical literature showing the effects of 
labour unions on innovation. There is also an empirical literature showing the 
relationship between labour unions and innovation. The level of wage bargaining, the 
bargaining agenda and the bargaining power distribution between the firms and the 
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6 
unions are among the important determinants of innovation (Bassanini and Ernst, 2002 
and Hirsch, 2004), yet there is controversy about their exact effects on firms' 
performance, innovation and labour productivity (see, Flanagan, 1999, for a survey on 
this topic). The existing empirical works showing the effects of union on innovation 
mainly show the effects of union power on the incentives for innovation. Freeman and 
Medoff (1984) show that the effect of unionisation is ambiguous on innovation. Using 
COMPUSTAT data, Bronas and Deere (1993) show that there is a significant negative 
relationship between firm-specific unionisation rate and innovation. Using mainly 
aggregative industry level data, Ulph and Ulph (1989) find a negative relation for the 
high-tech industries in England, while Addison and Wagner (1994) find a positive but 
insignificant relation. It is documented in Menezes-Filho et al. (1998) that most U.S. 
studies show a negative effect between union power and innovation, while the evidence 
from some European studies is less compelling.3 Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen 
(2003) also show strong and negative effects of unions on innovation in North America, 
while that is generally not the case in the UK. 
Our results can also be related to the literature that shows the effects of unions 
on innovation in general equilibrium growth models. Palokangas (1996) considers an 
economy where innovation requires only skilled labour, and the union-employer 
federation bargains for skilled and unskilled wages. In this framework, the paper shows 
that higher wages for unskilled workers boost innovation. Using a two-sector model 
where a high-tech sector innovates in the presence of union-firm bargaining and a 
traditional sector where there is no innovation and no labour union, Palokangas (2004) 
shows that an increase in union power increases innovation. Chu et al. (2016) show that 
an increase in union power creates a positive effect on innovation under an 
 
3
 In the European Union centralised unionisation is generally more common, while decentralised 
unionisation is more relevant in the U.S. See Iversen (1998) for an index of centralisation of wage 
bargaining in different countries. 
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7 
employment-oriented union, a negative effect on innovation under a wage-oriented 
union, and a neutral effect on innovation if the union is neither wage nor employment 
oriented. The wage raising effect in this strand of literature relates closely to the 
centralised union structure in our model. In line with the empirical evidences showing 
ambiguous effects of stronger unions on innovation, our results show that whether a 
centralised labour union, which is considered to be a stronger form of union than 
decentralised labour unions, reduces the incentive for innovation can be justified by the 
degree of product differentiation. Our paper provides testable hypotheses for future 
empirical works. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we describe 
the model and derive the results under symmetrically differentiated products. Section 3 
shows the implications of asymmetric product differentiation. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The implications of symmetric product differentiation 
We consider an economy where two firms, denoted by 1, 2k =  compete in quantities. 
We assume that initially firm 1 and firm 2 produce goods g  and h  respectively 
that are horizontally differentiated. Further, each firm may innovate a new product by 
investing 0.I >  We denote the new products of firms 1 and 2 by y  and z  
respectively. The R&D process in our work follows the model of Calabuig and 
Gonzalez-Maestre (2002), Haucap and Wey (2004) and Mukherjee and Pennings 
(2011) with the exception that, instead of assuming that R&D reduces the cost of 
production, our focus remains on new product development. Our modelling of 
product innovation is in line with Mukherjee and Sinha (2012).  
We assume that labour, iL , is the only factor of production where i  indexes 
the goods produced in the economy. The total labour demand per firm becomes 
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8 
k i
i
L L= ∑ . We assume that the production process exhibits constant returns to scale, 
meaning that each firm requires one worker to produce one unit of output. We depart 
from the analysis of heterogeneity in labour productivity as we want to study the 
effects of product innovation in isolation. The wages of the workers are endogenous 
and are determined by labour unions. In order to capture the maximum effect of 
unions’ wage setting behaviour, following Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) and 
Haucap and Wey (2004), we assume that the labour unions have full bargaining power 
over wage determination whereas the levels of employment and output are set by the 
firms subsequently.4 To avoid unnecessary complications and to have better insights 
on the hold-up problem, following Ulph and Ulph (1989, 1994, 1998), we assume that  
labour unions are unable to commit to wages before R&D.5  
Assume that the inverse market demand function of the thi  product is given 
by 
i i j
j
P a q qγ= − − ∑  
where, , { , , , }, ,i j g h y z i j= ≠  iP  and iq  denote the price and output of product i  
respectively. The parameter [ ]0,1γ ∈  measures the degree of product differentiation. 
 
4
 This type of wage determination is in line with the right-to-manage model of labour union. The wage 
determination, however, could take the form of efficient bargaining where the labour unions and the 
firms bargain over the wage rate and employment level simultaneously. The right-to-manage model 
gained more popularity in the policy circle compared to the efficient bargaining model because it is 
difficult to prescribe a contract which constitute an efficient combination of wages and employment. As 
reported by Oswald (1993), in response to his questionnaire: "Does your union normally negotiate over 
the number of jobs as well as over wages and condition?" only two US respondents (out of 19) and only 
three British respondents (out of 18) answered assertive. Layard et al. (1991) also offered some 
arguments in favour of this issue. He mentioned that bargaining does not generally takes place over 
employment simply because the existing workers only care about their own job securities rather than 
paying much attention to the employment level of the firms. In light of this argument, we adopt a 
right-to-manage model for our analysis.  
 In line with the cited literature we cast the analysis in a short-term bargaining context where union-firm 
bargaining does not involve R&D investment. It should be noted though there are real problems of 
long-term bargaining where the labour unions may bargain over firm’s R&D effort, product variety 
alongside wage. Incorporating such elements in the analysis lies outside the scope of the present paper 
but is left as a topic for future research. 
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9 
If 1γ = , the products are perfect substitutes and if 0γ = , the products are isolated. 
Since we consider products y  and z  to be different from products g  and h , we 
restrict our analysis to [0,1).γ ∈   
We consider the following game structure. At stage 1, the firms decide 
simultaneously whether to market a new product. At stage 2, the wages are 
determined by labour unions. To this extent we consider two different types of 
unionisation structures - a centralised union and decentralised unions - which we 
index by { },c dρ = . Finally, at stage 3, the firms compete like Cournot duopolists and 
the profits are realised. We solve the game through backward induction.  
 
2.1 The equilibrium outputs 
We start by considering the output game. At this stage, the firms take the number of 
products and the wages as given.  
First, consider the case where neither firm innovates a new product. If firm 1 
and 2 produce goods g  and h  respectively and if the wages paid by firm 1 and 2 
are 1w  and 2w , the respective equilibrium outputs are: 
( )
( )
1 2
2
1 2
2
2 2
ˆ
4
2 2
ˆ
4
g
h
a w w
q
a w w
q
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
γ γ
γ
γ γ
γ
− − +
=
−
− + −
=
−
 
Now consider the case where only firm 1 innovates the new product. In this situation, 
firm 1 produces g  and y  and firm 2 produces h. We get the resulting equilibrium 
outputs as: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 2
2
1 2
2
2
2 2
2 2
2
1
2 2
g x
h
a w w
q q
a w w
q
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
γ γ
γ γ
γ γ
γ γ
− − +
= =
+ −
+ + −
=
+ −
 

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10 
Similarly, if only firm 2 invests in innovating the new product, firm 1 produces g  and 
firm 2 produces h  and z . The resulting equilibrium outputs become: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 2
2
1 2
2
1
2 2
2 2
2 2
2g
h z
a w w
q
a w w
q q
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
γ γ
γ γ
γ γ
γ γ
+ + −
=
+ −
− − +
= =
+ −

 
 
Finally, consider the case where both firms innovate new products. In this situation, 
firm 1 produces g  and y  and firm 2 produces h  and .z  We get the outputs as: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 2
1 2
1
1 2
1
2 1 2
g x
h y
a w w
q q
a w w
q q
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
γ γ
γ
γ γ
γ
− + +
= =
+
+ − +
= =
+
 
2.2 Wages and profits 
Having derived the equilibrium output levels in Section 2.1, we now determine the 
equilibrium wages under the respective union structures conditional on firms' 
innovation strategies. 
 
2.2.1 A centralised union 
We start our analysis where the wages are set by a centralised labour union. Under 
such union structure we assume two types of wage setting behaviour of the labour 
union – uniform wage setting and discriminatory wage setting. The industry-wide 
union maximises the utility function ( ) kU w c L= − ∑ with respect to wage, w , in the 
former case, whereas it maximises ( ) ;k kU w c L= −∑   1, 2k =  with respect to 
wage, kw , in the latter case. We denote the reservation wage of the workers by 
( )0, .c a∈  
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11 

We get the equilibrium wage as ( )1
2
cw a c= +  regardless of the wage 
setting behaviour of the labour union. The rationale for this result follows from Dhillon 
and Petrakis (2002), who show that, when the union structure is centralised in nature, 
and firms' equilibrium outputs and profits are log-linear in input prices and market 
features such as the number of firms and product differentiation; the equilibrium input 
price remain the same irrespective of the degree of product differentiation and type of 
the product market competition. 
Given the centralised structure of the labour union, we now turn our analysis 
to stage 1 where the firms determine their investment levels towards innovation. On 
this note, we report each firm’s realised profits in Table 1 under the respective 
innovation strategies. Let [ ].,. ,ckpi  in Table 1 denote the profit of the thk  firm, 
1, 2,k =  where the first (second) argument shows the goods produced by firm 1 (firm 
2). For example, ( ), ,ck g y hpi     shows the profit of the thk  firm when firm 1 
innovates and produces goods g  and y  whereas firm 2 does not innovate and 
produces good h  only.  
Table 1: Firms’ pay-offs under a centralised union 
 
         
R&D No R&D 
 
R&D 
( ) ( )1 , ; , ,c g y h z Ipi   −   
( ) ( )2 , ; ,c g y h z Ipi   −   
( )1 , ; ,c g y h Ipi   −   
( )2 , ;c g y hpi     
 
No R&D 
( )1 ; , ,c g h zpi     
( )2 ; ,c g h z Ipi   −   
[ ]1 ; ,c g hpi  
[ ]2 ;c g hpi  
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12 
 
The closed form solutions of the profits are documented in Table A.1 in 
Appendix A. 
From Table 1 we derive the Nash equilibria of the innovation game for 
different investment costs. The incentive for a firm to innovate, given the strategy of 
its competitor is the difference in profits between innovation and no innovation. In the 
following proposition, we define the investment costs at which no firm innovates, 
both firms innovate and only one firm innovates. Accordingly, which Nash 
equilibrium is achieved depends on the size of the cost of innovation, .I   
 
Proposition 1: Assume that the labour union is centralised in nature. 
(a) Both firms innovate if ,clI I<  
(b) Neither firm innovates if ,chI I<   
(c) Only one firm innovates if c cl hI I I< <   
where, 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2 3 4
22 2
1 2 6 6 2
8 1 2 2 2
c
l
a c
I
γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ
− − + + + −
=
+ + −
  
and, 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 4
22 2
1 8 8
.
8 2 2 2
c
h
a c
I
γ γ γ
γ γ γ
− − + −
=
+ + −
  
Proof: Check that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 3
22 2 2
1 1 8 14 2 3
0.
8 2 1 2 2 2
c c
l h
a c
I I
γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ
+ − − + + +
− = − <
+ + + −
   
If ,clI I<  both firms innovate, and we denote this equilibrium by (RD, RD). If  
,
c
hI I>  neither firm innovates, and we denote this equilibrium by (No RD, No RD).     
If ,c cl hI I I< <  only one firm innovates, and we name these equilibria by (RD, No 
RD) and (No RD, RD). 
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13 
The incentive for innovation is driven by two effects – strategic benefit and 
non-strategic benefit of innovation (Roy Chowdhury, 2005). A firm's non-strategic 
benefit, chI  (strategic benefit, clI ) from innovation is given by its payoff from 
innovation, net of its payoff from no innovation, when the competitor firm does not 
innovate (innovates). 6  Formally, we define firm 1’s non-strategic and strategic 
benefits by 1 1[( , ); ( , )] [ ; ( , )]lI g y h z g h zρ ρ ρpi pi≤ −  and 1 1[ ; ] [( , ); ]hI g h g y hρ ρ ρpi pi≤ −  
respectively. Therefore, firm 1 does not innovate if its gross non-strategic benefit from 
innovation is less than the cost of innovation, i.e., chI I<  and firm 1 innovates if its 
gross strategic benefit from innovation is greater than the cost of innovation, i.e., 
.
c
lI I<  Since the firms are symmetric, similar arguments hold for the rival firm.7 
Proposition 1 shows that the non-strategic benefit from innovation is higher than the 
strategic benefit from innovation, i.e., .c cl hI I<   
Let us illustrate this further. Innovation creates two opposing effects on the 
profitability of the innovator. On the one hand, it tends to increase the profit of the 
innovating firm by allowing it to add variety to its products. On the other hand, the cost 
of innovation tends to reduce the profit of the innovator. If the cost of innovation is 
significantly small, i.e., clI I< , the first effect dominates the second effect, and both 
firms find innovation profitable. On the other extreme, if the cost of innovation is very 
high, i.e., chI I< , the second effect dominates the first effect, and neither firm finds 
innovation profitable. If the cost of innovation is moderate, i.e., c cl hI I I< < , a firm 
 
6
 There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium where the firms randomise on innovation and no innovation. 
However, we focus only on the pure strategy equilibria in this paper. 
7
 In the terminology of Ulph and Ulph (1998), the critical values lI ρ  and hI ρ represent “competitive 
threats", which is the difference between a firm's profits if it innovates and the profits if it does not 
innovate, given the strategy of its rival firm. 
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14 
finds innovation profitable if the other firm does not innovate so that the innovator’s 
gain from the new product is sufficiently large to cover the cost of innovation. 
 
2.2.2 Decentralised union 
Now, consider the scenario where the wages are set by the decentralised unions. The 
firm-specific union maximises the utility function ( )k k kU w c L= −  with respect to 
kw  where 1, 2.k =  
We summarise the equilibrium wages under four different constellations. If 
neither firm innovates, the equilibrium wages ex-post R&D are: 
( )
1 2
2 2
ˆ ˆ
4
d d a cw w
γ
γ
− +
= =
−
 
Next, we consider the case where only one firm innovates. For notational ease, we 
denote the innovating firm by ‘iv’ and the non-innovating firm by ‘nv’. In this case, 
the equilibrium wages give:  
( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
2
2
2
2
4 3 2 1 4
8 8
4 2 2 2 3
8 8
d
iv
d
nv
a c
w
a c
w
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ γ γ
γ γ
+ − + + +
=
+ −
+ − + +
=
+ −


 
Finally, if both firms innovate, the equilibrium wages yield: 
( )
1 1
1
.
2
d d a cw w
γ
γ
+ +
= =
+
 
The following lemma is immediate from the above discussion. 
 
Lemma 1: Assume that the labour unions are decentralised in nature. We get the 
following wage rankings: 
(a) Compared to the case with no innovation, innovation reduces the wage paid 
by the innovating firm when both firms innovate, i.e., ˆ 0,d dk kw w− < and when only one 
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15 
firm innovates, i.e., ˆ 0.d div kw w− <  
(b) The wage paid by the innovating firm is lower when both firms innovate 
compared to the case where only one firm innovates, i.e., 0.d dk ivw w− <   
Proof: See that ( )( )( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
2
2
1 1
ˆ ˆ0, 0
4 2 4 8 8
d d d d
k k k k
a c a c
w w ww
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ
− − − −
− = − < − = − <
− +
− + −

 
and 
( )( )
( ) ( )
2
2
2 1
0.
2 8 8
d d
k k
a c
ww
γ γ
γ γ γ
− −
− = − <
+ + −

  
Lemma 1 states that innovation makes the innovating firm more cost efficient by 
lowering the wages paid to the labour union. The intuition goes as follows. Innovation 
(compared to no innovation) increases the labour demand of the innovating firm. As 
unions care about employment and wages, the outward shift of the labour demand 
curve leads to a new equilibrium at the more elastic part of the labour demand curve, 
which results in a reduction of the equilibrium wage paid by the innovating firm. 
The second part of the lemma states that the firms become even more cost 
efficient when both firms innovate. The reason is that with both firms introducing new 
products to the market, the aggregate demand increases substantially, shifting the 
labour demand curve further out. The new equilibrium in the wage setting is on an even 
less elastic part of the labour demand curve, resulting in a lower wage. 
Having derived the equilibrium wage rates, we now derive equilibrium 
profits of the firms conditional on innovation strategies. The following table 
summarises the equilibrium net profits of the firms under decentralised unions. 
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
Table 2: Firms’ pay-offs under decentralised unions 
 
         
R&D No R&D 
 
R&D 
( ) ( )1 , ; , ,d g y h z Ipi   −   
( ) ( )2 , ; ,d g y h z Ipi   −   
( )1 , ; ,d g y h Ipi   −   
( )2 , ;d g y hpi     
 
No R&D 
( )1 ; , ,d g h zpi     
( )2 ; ,d g h z Ipi   −   
[ ]1 ; ,d g hpi  
[ ]2 ;d g hpi  
 
We report the closed form solutions of the profits in Table A.2 in Appendix A. Solving 
the above game analogous to the case of centralised union gives the following. 
 
Proposition 2: Assume that the labour unions are decentralised in nature. 
(a) Both firms innovate if ,dlI I<  
(b) Neither firm innovates if ,dhI I<   
(c) Only one firm innovates if d dl hI I I< <   
where, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
22
2 2
2 2 2 22 2
2 4 21 11
2 1 2 2 2 2 8 8
d
lI a c
γ γγγ
γ γ γ γ γ γ
 + −+ = − + −
 + + + − + − 
  
and, ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22
2
2 2 2 22 2
1 4 2 2 22 .
2 42 2 8 8
d
hI a c
γ γ γ γ
γ γγ γ γ γ
 + + + −
 = − −
 + −+ − + − 
  
Proof: Check that ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
2 22 2 2 2
1
2
1
0
2 4 2 1 2 8 8 2 2
d d
l h
a c
I I
γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
η− −
− = − <
− + + + − + −
 
where 
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17 
( )2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 01024 3968 3840 1680 2880 1056 1216 298 120 31 .γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γη γ+ + − − + + − + −= −
Analogous to the case of centralised union, dhI  and 
d
lI  denote a firm's non-strategic 
and strategic benefits from innovation respectively. The effects of innovation on a 
firm's profit, as discussed in Proposition 1, remain in Proposition 2.  
 
2.3 The effects of the unionisation structure on innovation 
Comparing the critical values mentioned in Propositions 1 and 2, we get the following 
investment ranking:8 
                       
c c d d
l h l hI I I I< < <                              (1) 
for [0,1).γ ∈  The above inequality suggests that, for a given cost of innovation, the 
number of firms investing in innovation cannot be lower under decentralised unions 
compared to a centralised union. 
Hence, the following proposition is immediate. 
 
Proposition 3: Decentralised unions provide higher incentive for innovation 
compared to a centralised labour union. 
In contrast to decentralised unions, a centralised union internalises (indirect) 
competition between labour unions. The bargaining power being more monopolised 
under the industry-wide union, the hold-up problem and hence, the equilibrium wages 
are also higher under such union structure than decentralised unions. Clearly, a higher 
wage demand by the centralised union serves as a negative externality towards firm’s 
innovation incentives. Therefore, the firms invest less under a centralised union than 
under decentralised unions. 
 
 
8
 The proof of the investment ordering is documented in Appendix A.3. 
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18 
2.4 Welfare analysis 
In this section, we discuss the social desirability of union intervention on firms' R&D 
efforts under the two union structures. We define social welfare (SW) as the sum of 
consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS) and union utilities (U). Due to the 
complexity of the mathematical expressions we restrict the welfare analysis to two 
polar cases across unions - the case where neither firm innovates and the situation 
where both firms innovate. We summarise the results below:  
 
Lemma 2: Decentralised unions yield higher social welfare compared to a centralised 
union regardless of whether no firm innovates or both firms innovate. 
Proof: See that      
	
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
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



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
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
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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

  and    
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
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
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





 



	
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
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
. 
The above results reveal that the level of social welfare is higher under the 
decentralised unions compared to a centralised union. This result is driven by the wage 
effects across the union structures. We find that the equilibrium wages are strictly lower 
under decentralised unions compared to a centralised union regardless of whether 
neither firm invests or both firms invest in innovating new products.9 Clearly, a lower 
wage demand by the firm-specific unions generates higher producers surplus, higher 
consumers surplus and lower union utility compared to industry-wide unions.10 In what 
follows the increase in producers surplus and consumers surplus outweighs the loss in 
 
9
 Straightforward calculations show that    



	
   when both firms refrain from 
innovation and      




  when both firms invest in innovation.  
10
 We find that !   ! "  




	

 , #  #  



	



 , $%  $%" 
 



	

  when no firms innovate and !  !  



	
	


 , #   # " 




	
	

 , $   $    





  when both firms innovate. 
	
		







19 
union utility, thus resulting in a overall higher welfare under the former union structure 
than the latter.  
 
3. The implications of asymmetric product differentiation 
Considering symmetric product differentiatio, we have shown in Section 2 that the 
incentive for product innovation is higher under decentralised unions. While symmetric 
product differentiation is certainly a useful starting point for the analysis, there is no 
reason to believe that the products cannot be differentiated asymmetrically. In a more 
general framework, one should use different parameters to capture the degrees of 
product differentiation between g, h, y and z. However, to make our discussions 
analytically tractable, we consider in this section, a particular type of asymmetric 
product differentiation to show that the results of Section 2 are sensitive to the 
assumption of symmetric product differentiation. We show that the incentive for 
product innovation may be higher under a centralised union if the products are 
asymmetrically differentiated. 
The model specific assumptions made in Section 2 also hold in this section 
with the exception that we consider the existing products of the firms, i.e., g and h, are 
perfectly substitutable. To economise on notations let’s define the existing products as 
product x. This modification gives us the inverse market demand functions for x, y and 
z, respectively, as: 
x x y z
y y x z
z z x y
P a q q q
P a q q q
P a q q q
γ γ
γ γ
γ γ
= − − −
= − − −
= − − −
 
We consider the game structure similar to Section 2. 
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3.1 The equilibrium outputs 
If there is no innovation by any firm, only product x  will be produced, and the 
inverse demand function becomes .x xP a q= −  Given the wages 1w  and 2w  for 
firm 1 and 2 respectively, the equilibrium outputs of firm 1 and firm 2 yield: 
( )
( )
1
2
1 2
1 2
1
ˆ 2
3
1
ˆ 2
3
x
x
q a w w
q a w w
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
= − +
= + −
 
Now, consider the situation where only firm 1 innovates a new product and firm 2 
does not innovate. This corresponds to 0.zq =  Straightforward calculations show 
that the equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2 are respectively: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
1
2
1 2
1 2
1
2 4 2 1
6 1
1 2
3
1
.
2 1
x
x
y
a
q
q
q
w w
a w w
a w
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ρ ρ
ρ
ρ
γ γ γ
γ
γ
− − + + +
=
+
= + −
 −
=  
+ 



 
If only firm 2 innovates, it implies that 0.yq =  In this situation, we get the 
equilibrium outputs as: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
2
1 2
1 2
2
1 2
3
2 2 1 4
6 1
1
.
2 1
x
x
z
a w w
a w w
a w
q
q
q
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
γ γ γ
γ
γ
= − +
− + + − +
=
+
 −
=  
+ 



 
Finally, consider the case where both firms innovate. In this situation, the equilibrium 
outputs give: 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
1
2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
2 4 5 2 1 22
3 2 3 2
2 2 1 2 4 52
3 2 3 2
2 2 1
2 3 2
2 2 1
.
2 3 2
x
x
y
z
a w w
q
a w w
q
a w w
q
a w w
q
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
γ γ γ
γ γ
γ γ γ
γ γ
γ γ γ
γ γ
γ γ γ
γ γ
 + − + + +
=   + + 
 + + + − +
=   + + 
+ − + +
=
+ +
+ + − +
=
+ +
 
 
3.2 Wages and profits 
In this section, we solve the wage setting game similar to Section 2. We begin our 
analysis with centralised union and investigate the firms' innovation incentives under 
such union structure. We repeat the same exercise under decentralised unions, in the 
subsequent section. 
 
3.2.1 A centralised union 
Similar to the case of symmetric product differentiation, we get the equilibrium wage 
as ( )1 ,
2
cw a c= +  irrespective of the innovation strategies adopted by the firms and 
regardless of whether the labour union charges a uniform wage or discriminatory 
wages. 
Next, we discuss the innovation game where we can construct a pay-off table 
identical to Table 1. To avoid analytical repetition, we only report the closed form 
solutions of firms’ profits in Table B.1 in Appendix B. The appended equilibrium 
profit levels in Table B.1 allow us to derive an investment ranking analogous to 
Proposition 1 which we report below.    
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Proposition 4: Assume that the labour union is centralised in nature. 
(a) Both firms innovate if ,clI I<  
(b) Neither firm innovates if ,chI I<   
(c) Only one firm innovates if c cl hI I I< <   
where, ( )
2
21 1
4 2 3
c
l
a cI γ
γ
 −
= −  + 
 and, ( )21 1 .
16 1
c
hI a c
γ
γ
 −
= − + 
  
Proof: Check that ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
2
2
1 4 5
0.
16 1 2 3
c c
l h
a c
I I
γ γ γ
γ γ
− − +
− = − <
+ +
   
The intuition of the above proposition is similar to that of Proposition 1. 
 
3.2.2 Decentralised unions 
Now consider the case of decentralised unions. If neither firm innovates, the 
equilibrium wages of firms 1 and 2 ex-post R&D can be found as: 
( )1 2 1ˆ ˆ 2 .3
d dw w a c= = +  
Next, we consider the case where only one firm innovates. The equilibrium wages of 
the innovating and non-innovating firm ex-post R&D are given by: 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
11 4 4
3 9
19 5 7
6 9
d
iv
d
nv
a c
w
a c
w
γ γ
γ
γ γ
γ
− + +
=
+
+ + +
=
+


 
Finally, consider the case where both firms innovate. In this situation, the equilibrium 
wages ex-post R&D are: 
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( ) ( )
( )1 2
5 2 2 7 8
.
3 8 7
d d a cw w
γ γ
γ
+ + +
= =
+

Upon inspection we get the following Lemma. 
  
Lemma 3: Assume that the labour unions are decentralised in nature. We get the 
following wage rankings: 
(a) Compared to the case of no innovation, innovation reduces the wage paid by 
the innovating firm when both firms innovate. 
(b) Compared to the case of no innovation, innovation increases the wage paid 
by the innovating firm when only one firm innovates, i.e., ˆ 0.d div kw w− >   
Proof: See that ( )( )( )
2 1
ˆ 0
3 8 7
d d
k k
a c
w w
γ
γ
− −
− = − <
+
 and ( )( )( )
1
ˆ 0.
3 9
d d
iv k
a c
w w
γ
γ
− −
− = >
+

  
While the intuitions for Lemma 1 also remain for the first part of Lemma 3, we find 
that the innovating firm pays a higher labour cost when only one firm invests in R&D. 
The reason is that when the products are asymmetrically differentiated the innovation 
by only one firm increases its own market share significantly compared to its 
non-innovating rival. The labour unions, in turn, also increase the wage pressure on 
the innovating firm by a substantial amount. The first effect being not so strong, the 
innovating firm pays a higher equilibrium wage when its rival firm refrains from 
innovating new products. 
Given the equilibrium wages prescribed above we can produce a pay-off 
matrix of the firms analogous to Table 2. We report the closed form solutions of the 
equilibrium profits in Table B.2 in Appendix B. 
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Proposition 5: Assume that the unions are decentralised in nature. 
(a) If 0 0.04γ< <  (i) both firms innovate if ,dlI I< 
 and neither firm innovates 
for .dlI I<    
(b) If 0.07 1γ< <  (i) both firms innovate if ,dlI I<  (ii) neither firm innovates if 
,
d
hI I<  and (iii) only one firm innovates if ,d dl hI I I< <      
where, ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
2
2
2 2 2
4 13 12 7 8 5 7 19
81 2 3 8 7 162 9
d
lI a c
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ
 + + + +
= − − 
 + + + 
 and, 
( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )
2
2
4 7 7 24 1 .
81 1 9
d
hI a c
γ γ γ
γ γ
 + + −
= − − 
 + + 
  
Proof: Check that 
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 3 4 5 6
2 2 2
1 135104 536108 719308 422853 105264 8379 7016
.
162 1 9 2 3 8 7
d d
l h
a c
I I
γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ
γ
γ γ γ
− − + + + + + −
− =−
+ + ++
We find that (RD, RD) is the equilibrium strategy for dlI I<  and (No RD, No RD) is 
the equilibrium strategy for .dhI I>  We also get that 
d d
l hI I<  for 0 0.04.γ< <  
Hence, it is immediate that both firms innovate when dhI I<  and neither firm 
innovates when .dlI I<  If ( ),d dh lI I I∈ , we get two pure strategy equilibria: both 
firms innovate (RD, RD) and neither firm innovates (No RD, No RD). We also find 
that each firm earns higher profit in the former equilibrium than in the latter. Hence, 
following the focal point argument (Schelling, 1960), we argue that higher profit in 
the former equilibrium acts as a focal point and induces both firms to innovate. 
Therefore, it follows that both firms innovate for dlI I<  and neither firm innovates 
for dlI I<  if 0 0.04.γ< <   
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However, for 0.04 1γ< <  we get that .d dl hI I<  Hence, the second part of 
the proposition is immediate.  
The intuition for the above result is similar to Proposition 2 with the 
exception that, in the presence of asymmetric product differentiation, the wage effects 
create higher strategic incentive for innovation when the degree of product 
differentiation is sufficiently low, i.e., 0.04.γ <   
 
3.3 The effects of unionisation structure on innovation 
We are now in a position to show the effects of the unionisation structures on 
innovation. Comparing the critical values mentioned in Propositions 4 and 5, we get 
the following investment orderings: 
                
   for   0< <0.04
   for   0.04 <0.35
   for   0.35 <1
c c d d
l h h l
c c d d
l h l h
c d d c
l l h h
I I I I
I I I I
I I I I
γ
γ
γ
< < <
< < < ≤
< < < ≤
                    (2) 
We discuss the results in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 6: (a) If 0 0.35γ< <  the incentive for innovation is higher under 
decentralised labour unions compared to a centralised labour union irrespective of 
whether both firms innovate or only one firm innovates. 
(b) If 0.35 1γ≤ < , the incentive for innovation is higher under a centralised 
labour union when only one firm innovates whereas it is higher under decentralised 
unions when both firms innovate.  
The above results suggest that the overall incentives for innovation under the respective 
union structures depend on the degree of product differentiation between the existing 
products and the new products. Straightforward calculations show that due the 
monopoly nature of the centralised union, it always charges a higher wage compared to 
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26 
decentralised unions irrespective of the product differentiation, regardless of the 
innovation strategies adopted by the firms. The output effect and hence, the impact on 
firms’ profits, on the other hand, varies with the degree of product differentiation. If the 
products are sufficiently differentiated i.e., 0 0.35γ< < , meaning that if the existing 
products and the new products are almost isolated, the new products do not have 
significant effects on the market shares of the existing products. In this situation, the 
wage effect dominates the output effect and the overall innovation incentive becomes 
lower under a centralised union than the decentralised unions. 
Next, consider the case where 0.35 1.γ≤ <  The above proposition shows that 
the incentive for innovation is higher under a centralised union when only one firm 
innovates ( . ., d ch hi e I I< ) whereas it is higher under decentralised unions when both 
firms innovate ( . ., ).c dl li e I I<  We explain these results in terms of non-strategic benefit 
for innovation ( )hI ρ and strategic benefit for innovation  ( )lI ρ  respectively (see 
Proposition 1 for definitions). We begin with firm 1’s non-strategic benefit for 
innovation where [ ] ( )1 1ˆ ; , ; .hI g h g y hρ ρ ρpi pi  ≤ −    Note that, under both unionised 
structures firm 1’s profits under no innovation i.e., [ ]1ˆ ;c g hpi  and [ ]1ˆ ;d g hpi  are 
independent of γ  (see Table B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B). This means that a change in 
product differentiation leaves these profits unaffected. However, a fall in product 
differentiation reduces firm 1's total profit when it undertakes R&D given that its rival 
(firm 2) does not invest in innovation. These profit losses occur under both unionisation 
structures.11 Since a lower wage pressure under decentralised unions generate higher 
outputs under such union structure compared to a centralised union, the loss in profits 
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 Check that ( ) ( )
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27 
due to lower product differentiation is also higher under the former structure than the 
latter. Hence, if the reduction in product differentiation is large, firm 1 invests more 
under a centralised union compared to decentralised unions. As the firms are symmetric 
in nature, similar argument holds for firm 2. 
Let us now consider firm 1’s strategic benefit for innovation where 
1 1[( , ); ( , )] [ ; ( , )]lI g y h z g h zρ ρ ρpi pi≤ −  . Given that firm 2 invests in innovation, a lower 
product differentiation leaves firm 1’s profit under centralised union, i.e., [ ]1 ; ( , )ˆ c g h zpi  
unaltered as it does not depend on the product differentiation parameter, γ . However, it 
reduces the profits of firm 1 under decentralised union when it does not innovate, as 
well as its profits under both unionised structures when it innovates.12 In what follows, 
the wage demand being higher under the centralised union, the loss in profit under the 
centralised union when firm 1 innovates dominates the loss in its profit under 
decentralised unions. Therefore, the strategic benefit being higher under the 
decentralised unions, the firm 1 (and firm 2 by similar argument) invests more under 
such union structures compared to an industry-wide union. 
 
3.4 Welfare analysis 
We now return to the discussion of welfare implications under the respective union 
structures. Similar to Section 2, we derive the welfare ranking as below. To avoid 
analytical repetition we only report the overall welfare comparison under the 
respective union structures. 
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Lemma 4: Decentralised unions yield higher social welfare compared to a centralised 
union regardless of whether no firm innovates or both firms innovate. 
Proof: See that      
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The intuitions of the above lemma are in line with Lemma 2. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper explains how unionisation structures, viz., centralised and decentralised 
labour unions, affect the incentive for product innovation. While few recent papers 
studied the effects of different unionisation structures on process innovation, our 
paper provides a new perspective to the literature by focusing on new product 
development. While process innovation is an important aspect of R&D, empirical 
observations suggest that the firms allocate a significant amount of their budget 
towards product R&D. We take up this issue in our paper and investigate how the type 
and degree of product differentiation affect the incentives for product innovation in a 
unionised labour market. We show that if the products are symmetrically 
differentiated, the incentive for innovation is higher under decentralised labour unions 
compared to a centralised labour union. However, considering a particular type of 
asymmetric product differentiation, we show that the incentive for innovation may be 
higher under a centralised labour union than decentralised unions.  
While the novelty of this paper lies in new product development and how the 
incentive for innovating a brand new product is influenced by different union 
structures, viz., centralised and decentralised unions, it would be equally intriguing to 
investigate how the results would differ if the products are differentiated vertically, if 
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29 
the firms compete in prices or act as a market leader, if the innovating firms invest 
both in product and process R&D, if the wage and employment negotiation between 
labour unions and firms take the form of efficient bargaining. As each of these 
questions would require a thorough analysis, we leave them for future work. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: The case of symmetric product differentiation 
 
Table A.1: Firms' payoffs under a Centralised Union 
Neither firm innovates 
[ ] [ ]
2
1 2
1
ˆ ˆ; ;
4 2
c c a cg h g hpi pi
γ
 −
= =  + 
  
 
One firm innovates 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 2
1 2 22
2
1 2 22
1 2
, ; ; ,
8 2 2
; , , ;
4 2 2
c c
c c
a c
g y h g h z I
a c
g h z g y h
γ γ
pi pi
γ γ
pi pi
γ γ
− + −
= = −      
+ −
−
= =      
+ −
 
 
  
Both firms innovate ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
1 2 2
1
, ; , , ; ,
8 1 2
c c
a c
g y h z g y h z I
γ
pi pi
γ
− +
= = −      
+
  
 
Table A.2: Firms' payoffs under Decentralised Union 
Neither firm 
innovates 
[ ] [ ] ( )( ) ( )
2
1 2 2 2
4
ˆ ˆ; ;
2 4
d d a cg h g hpi pi
γ γ
−
= =
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One firm 
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= =      
+ − + −
 
 
  
Both firms 
innovate 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 3
1 2 2 2
1
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2 2 1 2
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γ
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Appendix B: The case of asymmetric product differentiation 
 
Table B.1: Firms' payoffs under a Centralised Union 
Neither firm 
innovates 
[ ] [ ]
2
1 2ˆ ˆ; ; 6
c c a cg h g hpi pi − = =  
 
  
 
One firm innovates 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
2
1 2
2
1 2
13 5
, ; ; ,
144 1
; , , ;
6
c c
c c
a c
g y h g h z I
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γ
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γ
pi pi
− −
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− 
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Both firms innovate ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
1 2 2
13 12
, ; , , ; ,
36 2 3
c c
a c
g y h z g y h z I
γ
pi pi
γ
− +
= = −      
+
  
 
 
Table B.2: Firms' payoffs under Decentralised Union 
Neither 
firm 
innovates 
 
[ ] [ ] ( )
2
1 2
4
ˆ ˆ; ;
81
d d a cg h g hpi pi
−
= =   
One firm 
innovates 
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2
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Both firms 
innovate 
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